

CLASS OF 1923

Thesis

POLICY

Submitted by

Commander C. W. Nimitz, U. S. Navy.

**Naval War College
Newport, R. I.
1 September, 1922**

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POLICY
ITS RELATION TO WAR

Policy implies the principles underlying government action, having reference to some well defined aim or plan, primarily for self preservation and defense. It has its origin in the primitive instinct of self preservation and with increasing civilization it aims to further the economic interests and happiness of the people. A national policy is a statement of a nation's aims and purposes with reference to its dealings with its own citizens and with foreign states.

A policy of national defense may aim to safeguard against domestic turmoil and insurrection, or against attacks from dangerous neighbors. Similarly, policies aiming to further national interests and general welfare may involve action within national territory only, or may necessitate international relations. National policies may therefore be domestic or foreign and situations will determine which of the two great fields must be stressed. A state surrounded by powerful rival states, if the danger of war is always present, must become militaristic and develop a vigorous foreign policy. If too weak to protect itself it must seek alliances with its least hostile neighbors. A state isolated or surrounded by weak neighbors may devote itself to domestic problems and seek to build up the social and economic interests of the people.

Climatic conditions greatly influence the national development and therefore the national policies. Climatic conditions of temperature, humidity, seasonal changes, periods of storm, prevailing winds, all have an important part in

determining economic activity, and in affecting the physical and mental vigor of those who inhabit the land. Likewise geographic features have an enormous influence on a nation's possibilities. Possession or lack of natural resources such as forests, oils, coals, mineral wealth, precious metals, and many other sources of national wealth have a determining effect on national policy. Land nations with vast areas of arable land naturally turn their attention to agriculture. Island states with but little area for cultivation and with limited resources in metals, coals, or other basic commodities must devote their attention to commerce and this in turn enforces strong international policies.

Racial features also have their effect on policy. A whole nation thoroughly unified by a vigorous feeling of nationality will, through its clearly defined public opinion, strongly support national action in harmony with policy. On the other hand it is extremely difficult to develop a feeling of nationality among the conglomerate racial population in the United States. Racial distinctions destroy national unity through class distinctions and antagonisms. Austria-Hungary, before the Great War, contained many of the racial antagonisms that now exist in our country. Profiting by the example of the Austrian collapse it behooves us to take steps to remedy this evil condition. Complete stoppage of immigration and an intensive campaign of education for our new citizens is our best solution to this problem.

Economic welfare and the desire for material prosperity are strong forces behind policy. The need for foreign markets to absorb excess foods, raw materials, and manufactured articles; the need for more land to accomodate increasing populations, all make for strong foreign policies and seriously affect a

state's relations with neighboring states. Commercial rivalry and the struggle for land has always been a prolific cause for war and until human nature changes, we may expect a continuation of wars when rival interests clash in these respects.

Policy then has a definite relation to war. Policy to be effective must be founded on right and justice and must be backed by public opinion, particularly in a democratic country like the United States. In a highly centralized militaristic government like Japan the public opinion of the masses is relatively unimportant as the government through its control of the press can readily mould public opinion. In our altruistic and idealistic country it is essential that right and justice be at the root of our national aims. The public opinion of democracy loves justice and the square deal and hates oppression. Rightly trained it becomes the greatest support of policy, and here is the field of the statesman whose duty it is to create or mould public opinion.

A national policy must have its formal expression through some government agency. It may be contained in the national mind and voiced in public opinion, but to become a national policy it must be formulated by the government as a principle to determine national action. Historically, policies are voiced through the head of the government, upon whom rests the responsibility for success or failure. In the days of autocratic monarchs the king originated as well as formulated the policies of the state and these were good or bad just so far as the king was wise or unwise, strong and vigorous, or weak and vacillating. The verdict of history shows that it is unwise to trust so much power to one man, and the rise or popular government is evidence that progressive peoples desire to shape their own destiny.

Throughout the world at the present time the British Cabinet system with occasional variations is the method used for the definite formulation of policy. The Cabinet as the mouthpiece of the King and Parliament formulate such policies as directly concern the United Kingdom. In matters that affect the Empire the Premiers are consulted. In the United States the older and more autocratic system prevails except that the President is an elected officer whose decisions are subject to approval by an elected Senate.

Modern war as distinguished from the wars between the small private armies of autocratic monarchs, is a conflict between nations in arms. It is an attempt of one nation to impose its will upon the other by means of force. It is not only the struggle of two armies but of two nations who throw into the conflict their blood, their money, their moral force, their hopes and their liberty. In modern war the nations are mobilized financially and industrially as well as militarily. Modern war is not separate and detached from policy nor does it supersede policy. War is merely an instrument of policy, a means of furthering policy when the milder methods of diplomacy and arbitration fail.

War results when those policies which are really vital to a nation, to its existence or honor, clash with the policies of another nation which considers its interest equally vital to its own existence. Here diplomacy and arbitration fail, for no great nation will ever submit to arbitration any question which it regards as absolutely vital to its welfare, existence, or honor. Arbitration has been successful only in minor disputes where there were at stake no really vital matters. The arbitration of damage claims, fishery rights, boundary lines, and disputes of similar minor importance have been successful only because

there was no threat to the existence of either nation.

In the guidance of public opinion leading up to the formulation of policy it is the duty of the statesman to base that policy on the square deal and the principles of justice if he would be successful in upholding that policy when it is contested by rival states. No war which is not waged in furtherance of a just and well considered national policy is justified. Particularly is this so when the successful termination of the war will not contribute towards the accomplishment of the policy.

The sphere of the statesman then lies in the progressive and orderly advancement of a nation's interests; in the expression of definite policies; and in their vigorous, fearless, and consistent prosecution. In this respect the statesman is responsible for the conduct of war. The responsible naval and military officials can only make recommendations as to the forces necessary to support policy against possible antagonists. At this point the statesman enters the field of strategy in that before the clash of war he must have studied all conflicting policies with the forces that will probably support them and in turn he must study his country's resources and take steps to ensure that there are sufficient means to uphold policy in the event of war. Statesmanship is but commonsense applied to national affairs. Beyond this the statesman need not and should not go. Intermeddling with the control of fleets and armies can only result in disjointed action and possible disaster.

Upon the army and navy devolves the duty of prosecuting the war with the means furnished by the statesman and this can best be accomplished when the military and naval leaders understand the political object sought. No battle that does not contribute towards that object is justified. No step in the preparation of the forces furnished can be omitted. Plans of action against all conceivable enemies must be prepared and kept

up to date. Methods of training and equipment must keep pace with modern requirements. Upon the military and naval leaders lies the responsibility of creating a high morale without which our forces will be useless, like steel without temper.

With policies based on the principles of humanity, justice, and fair dealing; with well trained and farseeing statesmen, and with good military and naval leaders, there still remains the necessity of being prepared in the materials of war, particularly those which require long times for their preparation such as ships, heavy land artillery, and large naval guns. Such equipment cannot be hastily improvised and must be accumulated gradually before hostilities. Just as important is the organization of the nation for war both as regards man power and industrially. Wars have truly become national struggles and that nation which cannot quickly throw into the breach all of her able bodied men, properly equipped, and with national industrial organization for carrying on the war, will start with a severe handicap. Numerous examples are available in history for our reflection on this point.

In time of peace popular disinclination for military expenditure usually prevents adequate military preparation. This inconsistency complicates but does not relieve the statesman's responsibility for meeting the situation. This difficulty must be met by constant and skillful education of the public. No effort that aims lower than complete mobilization of the entire resources of the nation, moral, financial, industrial, and military should be considered sufficient.

It must be recognized that the time for the abolition of war has not yet arrived nor may we expect such a utopian condition until human nature makes radical changes. A nation

is but a collection of individuals and communities, and even in the most enlightened communities there are required elaborate jurisprudence with all the courts, police, and penal institutions for the maintenance of the principles of right and justice. In the community of nations there is no court of international justice whose edicts can be enforced. As nations still reflect the traits of individuals the just must continue to go armed for defense. We cannot therefore neglect our preparations.

The statesman must look to history for guidance in the future. Various authorities point out that from 1496 B.C. to 1861 A.D., a period of 3357 years, there were 227 years of peace and 3130 years of war, or thirteen years of war to one year of peace. Within the last three centuries there have been over 286 wars in Europe. During the period from 1500 B.C. to 1860 A.D. there were concluded more than 8000 treaties of peace which were meant to remain in force forever. If we accept the theory that nations are like individuals and subject to the same weaknesses and impulses, then we must keep ourselves ready. Until war can be abolished and nations live peacefully with each other

FORCE AND RIGHT WILL JOINTLY RULE THE WORLD: FORCE,
UNTIL RIGHT IS STRONG ENOUGH.

EARLY POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

With the exception of our treaty of alliance with France during our War of the Revolution our policy has been one of consistent isolation and freedom from entangling alliances. Our activities were turned inward to the consolidation of our newly made republic. This we were able to do only because of our distance from strong neighbors and because of their preoc-

cupation in life and death struggles with each other. Not possessing sufficient military strength to resist the encroachments of strong foreign nations and being free for the time from such encroachments our principles of Right, Justice and Democracy were enabled to take root. In our foreign relations we stressed those principles which were accepted only because at the time no strong adversary could contest them. We stood for Democracy or rule by the people as against monarchy or autocracy. To the rulers of Europe our American system was looked upon with as much suspicion as we regard Bolshevism today. During this time we made our first Proclamation of Neutrality in the war then raging between France and England.

Our experiment in democracy was closely watched not only by Europe but by the colonies of Spain in our neighborhood and on the continent to the southward. The oppression of Spain and her selfish exploitation policies lead to the loss of her colonies one after the other thru revolution. To these colonies struggling for their freedom as we had done we extended our sympathy and were the first to extend recognition when they had in fact established their authority and control. France copied our example and in 1793 set up a republic which we promptly recognized. The acts of our Executive at this time definitely established the principle that the Executive has discretionary power to determine when the United States should recognize a new government or a new nation, and that he will be guided in his decision by clear proof of a well established defacto government voicing the demands of the people as a whole.

The policy of "America for the Americans" had its inception in the minds of many of our people long before the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine. Alexander Hamilton in discussing the rights to navigate the Mississippi declared that the United

States must acquire sooner or later all the territory between the two oceans. Herein began the expansion policy of the United States. The Louisiana lands were secured by purchase in 1803 and the Floridas by treaty in 1820-21. In 1845 the annexation of Texas, in 1846 the settlement of the Oregon dispute with Great Britain, and in 1848 the treaty with Mexico adding the California lands to the United States definitely rounded out our general boundaries.

The small population of the United States after the revolution and the rapid expansion and acquisition of new lands introduced the necessity for immigration which we freely invited. The South secured its labor in part by the breeding of slaves and by their illegal importation. The North and West encouraged emigration from Northern Europe so that from 1820 immigrants began to come in ever increasing numbers into the industrial centers of North and farm lands of the West where they rapidly became assimilated and absorbed into the American stock. The United States was fondly thought of as the refuge for the oppressed of all nations. Even as late as 1868 the Burlingame Treaty with China permitting Chinese immigration declared that the right of expatriation is "a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" and that any restriction thereof is "inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Republic."

By 1870 the demand for a constantly larger supply of cheap labor became so great that it had become a question of economics rather than of humanitarianism. By this time however the character of the immigrants had begun to change, the source of supply shifting from Northern to Southern Europe and from Southeastern Europe from whence came the many races so difficult to assimilate.

We received the refuse from all the countries of Europe which resulted in lower standards of living, labor riots, and even international complications. We then made a change in our immigration policy by restricting the admission; first, of illiterates, and of diseased, immoral, criminal, and anarchistic immigrants; second, of labor induced to come to the United States thru labor contracts; and third, by the prohibition of immigration from China. This was followed in 1882-88 by acts to prohibit the immigration of Chinese labor, and in 1907-11 Japan agreed to prohibit emigration of its laborers to our shores. Thus the open door to immigration is being slowly closed and in the near future we may expect to see it entirely closed, a condition which will be welcomed by the majority of Americans.

The principles of the Monroe Doctrine had their inception and were practised in the United States long before they were formally enunciated by President Monroe in 1823. In substance the Doctrine declared:-

1. A policy of isolation from European affairs.
2. That as for the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have acknowledged, we could not view any inter-position for the purpose of oppressing them, or in controlling in any other manner their destiny, by an European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards us.
3. That henceforth the United States would consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any part of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.
4. That the occasion has been judged proper for assert-

ing as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American Continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.

This doctrine met with the hearty endorsement of all the people and was greeted with enthusiasm thruout Latin America. It definitely put an end to the designs of the Holy Alliance against the Colonies. Great Britain concurred in all of the doctrine except the last part and asserted that the unoccupied parts of America were still open to settlement. The real significance of the doctrine, enunciating a policy of Pan-Americanism was not fully grasped at the time by European powers but was already clearly in the minds of Americans.

Pan-Americanism has for its object the closer union, economic, scientific, and social, between the United States and the remainder of the states on the two American continents. It aims to develop an American system, a sort of informal League of American Nations, having the Pan-American Union as its Secretariat and the Pan-American Congresses as conferences.

Shortly after the discovery of gold in California the subject of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama became very much alive. It had come up for discussion before but not seriously. In 1846-1848 we made a treaty with Colombia, then owning the Isthmus, the gist of which was that we guaranteed the neutrality of the Isthmus and Colombia's rights of sovereignty over it in return for the privilege of a free and open transit by rail or canal across the Isthmus.

In the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 we agreed to construct and control the canal jointly with Great Britain and to prevent the encroachments of either contracting party on territory of

Central America. This treaty was never popular in the United States primarily because of the division of the control and numerous efforts were made to abrogate the treaty.

During our Civil War France became interested in a canal across the Isthmus as a part of her plan of expansion into the South Seas. In 1896 President Grant warned against the danger of allowing any European power to build a canal, and in 1880 Hayes declared that any canal should be an American canal, under American control, and he advised negotiations looking towards the modification of the conflicting treaties. In 1879 a French company was formed to build a canal and in 1881 DeLesseps started work at Panama. The French effort was not successful because of the inability of the French to combat the fevers of the jungle and because of insufficient funds.

After the Spanish-American War the acquisition of territory in the Pacific made the canal a matter of strategic necessity and in 1901 the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was completed and ratified. This treaty definitely abrogated the objectionable Clayton-Bulwer treaty and left the United States free to construct and control the canal, subject to the general provision of its neutrality. It admitted the United States' right of control over the canal in time of war and it contained no prohibition against erection of fortifications for defense of the canal. It provided for equal treatment to ships of all nations.

At the same time we decided to build the canal at Panama rather than at Nicaragua and to this end a treaty was made with Colombia which the Congress of that state refused to ratify on the ground that it was in violation of their constitution and that it infringed on their sovereignty. This caused a revolution in Panama and the establishment of a separate Republic of Panama which President Roosevelt hastily recognized. The desired

treaty was at once negotiated and the site chosen at Panama. Colombia objected and quoted our guarantee of neutrality given by the treaty of 1848 with Colombia. The controversy was finally settled this year. It cannot be claimed that our actions in securing the treaty with Panama are entirely above suspicion or in accord with our avowed policy of square dealing. However, expediency and necessity must be accepted as our excuse for obtaining this waterway which is so essential to rapid mobilization of the Fleet in either ocean and to our Pacific policies.

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UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE PACIFIC.

Our interest in the Pacific dates from 1784 when the American ship *Empress of China* entered Canton and initiated trade between that country and the United States, a trade which grew steadily until the war of 1812, during which time it fell off, to revive somewhat after the war. Our first treaty of Peace, Amity, and Commerce was obtained in 1844. This was renewed with various modifications in 1858, and in 1868 the Burlingame treaty was made, agreeing among other matters to the open door in the United States for Chinese immigrants whose services were needed on the West Coast. It was thru our unselfish policy and to a general reputation for fair dealing that China began to look upon us as her best friend.

In 1870 mob agitation against Chinese labor developed in the West culminating in the riots and murders that continued until a definite policy of Chinese exclusion was embodied in the treaty of immigration ratified in 1894. In the Chinese-Japanese War and in the subsequent peace negotiations the United States extended its friendly offices and good will impartially to both contestants.

Beginning in 1895 the chief European powers, anticipating the

breakup of the Chinese Empire, began a struggle or scramble for spheres of interest, which was at its height while we were at war with Spain. Our successful termination of that war gave us the Philippines and a definite status in Far Eastern affairs, which entitled us to be heard in the affairs of China. When in 1899 Great Britain and Russia made an agreement as to their respective spheres north and south of the great wall, it became necessary for the United States to act. Secretary of State John Hay accordingly addressed notes to Great Britain, Russia, Germany, Japan, France, and Italy, suggesting an international agreement for the maintenance of the principle of equal and impartial trade for all nations in China and that there be no discrimination for or against any nation in port dues or railroad charges. This was the beginning of the Open Door policy and it met with the approval of the British Government and in due time secured the endorsement of the other powers, whose subsequent actions however were not governed by their pledges.

The aggressions of the European powers aroused the anger of the Chinese and resulted in the Boxer Rebellion during which many foreigners were murdered. In the concerted action of the powers that followed the United States took part and in 1900 we issued another note defining our policy in which we were determined to safeguard the territorial and administrative entity of China even while we were striving to restore a condition of peace and protect the foreigners. We again emphasized the principles of the Open Door or equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire. These principles were adopted by the allied forces as the basis for the settlement with China. Our influence moderated the demands on China which, coupled with our action in returning to China about thirteen millions of dollars paid in excess of actual damages earned China's gratitude.

Our influence in China reached its height in 1905 thru the statesmanship of John Hay with the backing of President Roosevelt. In 1909 Secretary Knox in pursuance of "dollar diplomacy" proposed that the Manchurian Railroad Systems be pooled, held by an international syndicate, and managed along commercial rather than political lines. Russia and Japan were suspicious and rejected the plan. Subsequently the United States participated with other powers in floating two large loans for railroad construction in China and thereby strengthened our influence.

In 1911 a rebellion against the throne resulted in the establishment of a Republic of China which was recognized in May, 1913. The new republic, badly in need of money, tried to negotiate a loan from the four powers already syndicated and from Russia and Japan in addition. After long negotiations China received assurances of the loan but on such terms that President Wilson considered that China's sovereignty was in danger of infringement and refused to let the United States bankers participate. The loan was made by the other five powers and while we were technically correct in our aloofness we could have done China more good by taking part in the loan.

Our error in this case was well understood later and in 1918 the State Department announced that if bankers interested in Chinese loans would cooperate with the government and follow the policies outlined by the State Department, the government would aid in every possible way and would take every possible step to insure the execution of equitable contracts made in good faith by American citizens. This is a most important policy and in line with our Open Door policy.

In tracing our policy in the Pacific we must note our relations with Korea but it cannot be claimed that our actions in regard to that unfortunate country will bear close scrutiny. Our

one and only treaty with Korea was made in 1883 and in it we agreed to exert our good offices toward it if other powers should deal unjustly or oppressively toward it. During the Russo-Japanese War Korea declared its neutrality but Japan ignored this, landed troops in Korea and forced that country to become an ally. After the war, Japan by threat and violence extorted a treaty placing Korea under Japan for protection in which action our government acquiesced in spite of appeals from Korea. Here we clearly violated our pledge to Korea and thereby encouraged Japan in her subsequent efforts to blot out the national life of Korea.

The Spanish-American War in addition to precipitating us into the Chinese affairs, gave us Hawaii in that the war resulted directly in our accepting Hawaii's desire to be annexed. The long haul to the Philippines lead to our frequent violation of Hawaii's neutrality and indicated how necessary those Islands were to us so long as we had interests in the Far East. The Republic of Hawaii had for several years previously attempted to secure a treaty of annexation which was refused because of the suspicions we entertained as to the methods used in overthrowing the monarchy. Our annexation of Hawaii brought forth an energetic protest from Japan which country had many nationals in Hawaii and looked with a longing eye upon the Islands.

Samoa was acquired in 1878 by treaty with the natives and in 1899 agreed to in a treaty made with Great Britain and Germany. It is useful to us only as an outlying naval base as is also Guam which was acquired from Spain along with the Philippines. The Midway Islands were occupied by the United States in 1867 and Wake Island in 1899 thus completing our holdings in the Pacific.

Upon our taking over the Philippines President McKinley

voiced our policy of the Philippines for the Filipinos in the following words:

" The Philippines are ours, not to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self government. This is the path of duty we must follow or be recreant to a mighty trust committed to us."

The Filipinos fully expected to take over the reins of government immediately that Spain was expelled from the Islands and upon our refusal to follow that course they revolted under the leadership of Aguinaldo. The insurrection was put down and the Islands soon restored to order.

The United States has been true to its trust and has faithfully carried out its policy of development, civilization, education, and training for self government. The control of Philippine affairs is being handled more and more by Filipinos and while the Progress of the whole gets an occasional set back by the actions of a few unprincipled politicians the development is proceeding as fast as can be expected in a country that under Spanish rule was constantly held back. There is no doubt but that in the not too far distant future we will see the Philippine Republic functioning under the protectorate of the United States. The successful conclusion of the Washington Conference with the settlement of difficult Far Eastern questions will go a long way towards insuring the future of an embryo Philippine Republic.

Before that state is reached however much remains to be done. As a mass the Filipinos are still not qualified for self government and the large uneducated mass can be easily controlled by the educated politicians who are few in number and not always as honest and scrupulous as they should be. The

attention of the masses must also be turned more uniformly to agriculture and the skilled trades in order to develop a well rounded state.

Our interest and relations with Japan date from 1853-54 as a result of Commodore Perry's visit and treaty of amity which was followed by commercial treaties in 1857 and 1858. From that time down to the end of the Russo-Japanese war the friendliest relations existed between us, and Japan had material evidence of our friendship in the financial and moral support accorded them in the war with Russia and in our friendly offices in the peace negotiations that followed. From then on our relations grew less friendly as we began to note Japan's tendency to imperialism and expansion, and her treatment of Korea, which did not accord with our idea of the proper functioning of a protectorate.

Japan emerged from her war with Russia as a world power and with worldly aspirations. With the departure of the British fleet as a result of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of January 30, 1902, and with the successful conclusion of the war with Russia, Japan was left dominant in Far Eastern affairs. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was aimed at Russia, England's duty being to keep Germany out of the war that Japan was then planning against Russia for control of Korea. By the Alliance treaty the two powers recognized the independence of Korea and China and also the special interests of Great Britain in China and Japan in Korea. Each power pledged joint defense of these interests and the maintenance of strict neutrality in case the other should become involved in a war with a third power, and also agreed to join it in case two or more powers should unite in hostilities.

On August 12, 1905, after the successful end of the Russo-

Japanese War the alliance treaty was revised by recognizing Japan's rights in Korea and by extending Japan's Asiatic responsibilities to India whose frontier claims against Russia were guaranteed. These boundary claims were adjusted in 1911 and on July 13, 1911, the alliance treaty was again revised with a stipulation that if either of the contracting parties should conclude a treaty of arbitration with a third power it should not be obligated under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to go to war with that third power. The United States was at that time negotiating an arbitration treaty with England and friction between the United States and Japan had already begun to develop. This was England's safeguard against being drawn into a war with us as an ally of the Japanese. Fortunately for the United States the Washington Conference in the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance replaced it with a much more satisfactory treaty and one which will go far towards preventing conflict in the Pacific.

Friction between Japan and the United States began just after the Russo-Japanese War. At that time there were about 25,000 Japanese in this country and almost all were on the West Coast. By 1910 there were over 70,000, a number in excess of the number of Chinese. In 1906 the San Francisco board of education passed an ordinance segregating into a special school all children of oriental races. Japan's protest to the national government resulted in the board's withdrawing the objectionable ordinance but only on the condition that further immigration of Japanese laborers was prohibited. No treaty was made to cover this but Congress passed an act in February 1907 to regulate the admission of aliens into the United States, and in 1907-1908 the so called "Gentleman's Agreement" was made whereby Japan agreed to issue no passports to laborers who

desired to come to the United States. This principle was affirmed in 1911 at the time of making a new treaty of commerce and navigation.

In 1913 California again precipitated a crisis by the passage of an act providing that aliens not eligible to citizenship may own or transmit land only so far as the rights are secured by treaty. Japan declared this act to be in violation of her rights and to be an unjust and obnoxious discrimination against national and racial dignity. These discriminations against the Japanese remain as a constant source of irritation, a state which was not improved by President Wilson's opposition to Japan's request at the Paris Conference after the Great War, for an "acceptance of the principle of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals.

Japan's defeat of China in 1894-5 together with the absorption of Korea and Manchuria definitely initiated Japan's career of expansion. For convenience and for meeting our objections she developed a Japanese Monroe Doctrine similar to ours in name only as she exploited instead of protecting the nations in her vicinity if we may judge from her treatment of Korea and China. In this policy of expansion Japan has received powerful help from the prestige of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. So far Japan's treatment of China has been within the diplomatic pale in that all her acts are covered by treaties seemingly correct. The Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908 distinctly pledges Japan to maintain the Open Door policy in China with guarantees of territorial and administrative integrity. The same pledge is reaffirmed in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement in 1917. Japan leaves China the shell of sovereignty and absorbs the kernel.

In the Great War Japan captured Kiaochow in 1914 and although it was the property of an ally in the war she subse-

quently seized the whole province of Shantung. In January 1915 she delivered her famous "Twenty One Demands" to China which if accepted would deprive China of her sovereignty and make her a vassal of Japan. After some protests from some foreign states who were occupied in the war and after some slight concessions Japan secured China's agreement under threat of war. In May the United States sent notes to both China and Japan to the effect that "We cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into, or which may be entered into, between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of China, or the international policy commonly known as the Open Door Policy". This strong note without the backing of force had no effect on Japan except to further irritate her against the United States. By the Twenty One Demands Japan gained control over Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Shantung, and Fukien Province. Japan took advantage of the military situation on the West Front at this time to secure a promise from the Allies that at the peace conference Japan should secure Shantung and the German Islands north of the equator.

In this account of Japan's rise in the Pacific it must be noted that at each turn for increased territory she met with strong protests from the United States blocking her way. It is small wonder that she should prepare feverishly her army and navy for the struggle that was certain to come the moment she found herself strong enough to stop by force our continual obstruction to her policies. The lack of force behind our notes lent her encouragement. The matter of racial discrimination and land ownership in California was never so vital to Japan's existence that she would have gone to war

over it. In her expansion policy in China she was vitally concerned for without the natural resources of that country, Japan's existence as a world power was at stake and so long as our Open Door policy stood in her way Japan was prepared to fight. Although the Washington Conference affirmed the policy of the Open Door and the territorial and administrative entity of China and Japan has apparently acquiesced, it behooves us as the principal exponent of the Open Door, to keep ready to maintain it by force.

The Naval Appropriation Act of 29 August 1916, states:

"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to adjust and settle its international disputes thru mediation and arbitration to the end that war may be honorably avoided. It looks with apprehension and disfavor upon a general increase in armament thruout the world, but it realizes that no single nation can disarm, and that without a common agreement upon the subject every considerable power must maintain a relative military strength."

The above quotation is the germ that grew into the Washington Conference which met in Washington on 11 November, 1921 and adjourned on 6 February, 1922 having accomplished the following definite results:

FIRST

A covenant of limitation of naval armament between the United States, the British Empire, Japan, France, and Italy, which fixes the total major ship tonnage of each of these countries in the following ratios: 5:5:3:1.75:1.75, with a total allowance of major ship tonnage to the United States and Great Britain of 525000 tons each and to the other powers in the ratios

stated above. This treaty also limits the tonnage of new major ship construction to 35000 tons and of new aircraft carriers to 27000 tons. Major ships may carry guns not to exceed 16", and air craft carriers are limited to 8" guns. This treaty also includes an agreement between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, to keep the Islands of the Pacific, with certain exceptions, in status quo as regards naval bases and fortifications. This does not include the Hawaiian Islands, nor those adjacent to the Panama Canal Zone, nor those adjacent to Alaska so far as the United States is concerned but it does include Guam and the Philippines.

SECOND

A Four Power Treaty between the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan, relating to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific.

THIRD

A Five Power Treaty between the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, limiting the use of submarines and noxious gas in warfare.

FOURTH

A Declaration accompanying the Four Power Treaty reserving American rights in mandated territory.

FIFTH

An agreement supplementary to the Four Power Treaty defining the application of the term "insular possessions and insular dominions" as relating to Japan.

SIXTH

A Nine Power Treaty between the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, China, Holland, and Portugal, relating to principles and policies to be followed in matters pertaining to China.

SEVENTH

A Nine Power Treaty between the same countries as above relating to Chinese Customs Tariff.

In general it may be said that the result of the Washington Conference has been to remove many of the points of difference between the United States and Japan. The question of racial discrimination and exclusion still remains and may at any time serve as a pretext for trouble should we neglect to maintain the strength allowed us by the limitations agreement. The policy of the OPEN DOOR and the principle of the territorial and administrative integrity of China have been solemnly reaffirmed and their meanings have been more clearly defined than heretofore. China's position has been greatly clarified and strengthened and she is now in a position to work out her own destiny. Not only has the cost of naval armaments been cut but the cause for war in the Pacific has been reduced. It remains to be seen how far each country will go in keeping its pledges. In the meantime it is the duty of our statesmen to keep our naval strength up to the standard allowed if we are to be ready to go to the support of our pledges.

Aside from our questionable action in regard to Colombia and Korea all of our policies have been in keeping with the principles of right, justice, and fair dealing. Our failure to have sufficient force ready at all times to support our

policies has been our main fault. Our treatment of Colombia gained us the suspicion and distrust of our Latin-American neighbors while our neglect of pledges made to Korea and our failure to back with force our many protests regarding violations of the Open Door has lead Japan to regard us as weak kneed and pacifistic.

Our duty now lies in the awakening of public opinion to the necessity of backing with force those of our traditional policies which are still in effect. To make our task of education easier we must first of all stop all immigration of peoples which we can not readily assimilate and make into good citizens. We must thoroughly Americanize those elements of our population which through ignorance or choice have retained their European standards of living and thinking. The Washington Conference is but a beginning of universal understanding. The pledges made there regarding the OPEN DOOR and the INTEGRITY OF CHINA are but reaffirmations of pledges made several times before and broken when expediency demanded. Remembering these things we should hold ourselves in readiness to support with force those pledges which we have so solemnly given.

Policy
By Chester W. Nimitz

Commander Chester W. Nimitz graduated from the Naval War College in 1923. One of the requirements for graduation was the completion of two theses on assigned topics. Policy was one assigned topic and Nimitz turned in his thesis on September 1, 1922. He discussed national policy in relation to war and its components, a history of early policies of the United States, and United States policy in the Pacific, with a discussion of the Washington Treaty.